Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
Introduction
Development been described as a story of initial optimism, followed by disappointment (Escobar 1994) . Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have followed a similar trajectory. Much development studies scholarship has attempted to describe, promote, condemn, improve or leave behind this diverse class of organisations (for instance, Igoe and Kelsall 2005) . The notion that NGOs are uniquely placed to do certain kinds of development work has been tarnished, yet they continue to control significant resources.
Meanwhile, a broad range of scholarship has discussed the various features of Nigeria's political landscape, often emphasising factors that perpetuate underdevelopment and poverty. Nigeria's 'intense ethnic polarisation and conflict' (Mustapha 2005, 4) , and its 'swelling state, feeding political corruption and instability' (Diamond 1988, 33 ) have created a situation in which 'routine relationships between the state and society [are] …dominated by discourses on the illegitimacy of instrumentalized distribution and disorder' (Gore and Pratten 2003, 212) .
Amid declining confidence in some of the key institutions of development and unpromising political contexts such as Nigeria, some actors have called for a more flexible approach, particularly regarding the necessity of 'good government' for development (Hickey 2012) . Scholars such as those working at the 'Africa Power and Politics Centre' have made important progress in exploring what 'development patrimonialism' and working 'with the grain' might entail (e.g. Kelsall 2008 Kelsall , 2011 Crook and Booth 2011; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012) . In short, these scholars have argued that certain forms of governance and accountability in sub-Saharan Africa that diverge from Western ideals persist. Given their apparent durability, development actors are obliged, so the argument goes, to work within rather than against such norms.
Much work, however, remains to be done in elaborating what these ideas might mean in practice.
This paper is a review of and empirical contribution to these debates. It presents case studies that contrast different approaches to dealing with one manifestation of Nigeria's political arrangements. In Kebbi state, in North-West Nigeria, the political activities of a large international NGO and medical professionals are described, demonstrating their broadly similar political agendas. Both are attempting to cajole the state government into reforming health care provision, yet they do so with strikingly different tactics and results.
The medical professionals are shown to be skilled political operators, able to use a variety of techniques to extract significant changes from the local government -though not without some awkward compromises. In contrast, the NGO struggles to make the best of its capacity, as it is tied to a set of inflexible and ineffective tactics in its programmes and advocacy.
These case studies suggest that the debate about going 'with the grain' needs to be mindful of both the deep level of expertise that it is often required to effectively engage with patrimonial states, and the substantial practical and moral risks involved in building partnerships with deeply undemocratic and inequitable systems of government.
The State NGOs Are In
NGOs operating in Kebbi state do so in a specific political context. The premise of this analysis is that the ability and the willingness to adapt to this context is a key determinant of how influential NGOs can be. Here, conceptual debates about how to describe the patron-client relations in Africa are discussed, as are the specific concepts that are most useful in describing Nigeria's political system. In addition, some salient aspects of Kebbi's recent history are presented. Then, debates about the role NGOs play in Africa are reviewed.
Patrons and clients in Africa
Scholars -especially but not exclusively Africanists -in describing political systems that diverge from Western ideals have developed a set of related, overlapping and sometimes muddled terms, including: 'clientism', 'patrimonialism', 'neopatrimonialism', 'prebendalism', 'Big Man politics' and 'godfatherism' (for useful overviews, Pitcher et al. 2009 ).
Whilst these concepts have appeared in various guises and emphasise different issues, they all attempt to describe societies that feature both legal-rational forms of government and the informal distribution of patronage by public office holders.
Virtually any society matches this description to some extent, but especially so, it is argued, in many postcolonial African states where formal institutions often lack legitimacy (Englebert 2000) .
However, many of these concepts have been strongly challenged. It has been argued that neo-patrimonialism has been applied to so many different cases that it becomes a 'catch all' term with "little analytical content" (Mkandawire 2013, 6) ; that it is part of an anti-government neoliberal project; or an Afro-pessimist tradition that revels in the misery of the continent (see Erdmann and Engel 2007, and deGrassi 2008, for summaries of these debates). In particular, discussing African corruption and clientelism risks describing social relationships in highly normative, ethnocentric terms, a problem which more universal, neutral terms like 'neopatrimonial' only partly avoid (Blundo 2006, 22; Booth 2009, 9-18) .
Furthermore, it has been argued that the concept is often invoked abstractly, without sufficient empirical grounding. Jean-Francois Bayart, one of the most influential Africanist theorists of corruption, has rightly been taken to task for his tendency to assert "definitive positions despite the flimsy evidential material at his disposal", and "to parade innuendo and hearsay as facts" (Mustapha 2002, 3) .
Patrimonialism in Nigeria
Consequently, if these concepts are to be invoked at all, it is essential that they are used with precision and with empirical grounding. Daniel Jordan Smith is surely correct when he argues that in Nigeria, "navigating corruption preoccupies people in all kinds of everyday endeavours, and talk about corruption dominates popular discourse" (2007, xiv) . Yet these observations are the beginning of an enquiry, not the end, and care must be taken to properly conceptualise and empirically validate such observations. For this study, it is essential to analyse patrimonialism not merely as a dysfunctional appendage to society, but instead part of "ordinary forms of sociability" (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006, 8) ; not merely as a form of occasional criminal deviance, but instead a practice "at the core of relations between public services and their users" (ibid, 4). Even legal systems, seemingly at odds with practices of informal patrimony, become shaped by them; as Nuijten and Anders argue " corruption and law are not opposites but constitutive of one another" (2007, 2) . Richard Joseph's concept of 'prebendalism' (1987) also takes this approach, and is a useful model for this study. Joseph's formulation describes not only the exploitation of public positions by their incumbents, but also the extensive legitimating practices in which "the appropriation of such offices is not just an act of individual greed or ambition but concurrently the satisfaction of the short-term objectives of a subset of the general population" (ibid, 67).
Further, he shows how Nigeria's complex and politicised ethnic groupings, its elections, and the distribution of patrimony are mutually reinforcing parts of the same system (ibid, esp. 30-54) . Once the practice of dispensing wealth to secure political supportpatrimonialism (or the same, but concealed behind a modern institutional façade -neopatrimonialism) is conceptualised as part of a broader political system, important insights become visible. In particular, it emphasises that office-holders must at least "appear [to be] responsive to the wishes of wider sets of people" (ibid, 54) . This is a crucial opening that, as we shall see, some groups exploit more effectively than others.
If a patrimonial system is indeed pervasive and embedded, political actors might well determine that accommodation is better than confrontation. Tim Kelsall's formulation of working "with the grain" (2008; 2011) is a challenge to development actors to move beyond 'good government' orthodoxies and instead "work with the realities of country governance as they find them" (Crook and Booth 2011, 101 (2013, 14) .
If accommodating patrimonial systems is to be a significant part of working 'with the grain', much exploration of the promises and pitfalls to this approach needs to be done. This study, then, is an assessment of how two particular sets of actors engage with an existing political order. An analysis of their successes, failures and compromises is a way of thinking through the possibilities and limitations of such strategies.
Violent repression
Nigeria became infamous for its violent repression during the Abacha administration 1966 , 1975 , 1983 , 1985 and 1993 (Falola and Heaton 2008 Despite these disruptive trends, patrimonialism and violent repression are notable constants in recent decades. Given that the Nigerian state is prone to using patrimony to pacify certain constituencies, and violence to repress others, advocates of social and political change have to carefully navigate their relationship with the state and employ innovative strategies in order to achieve their goals.
Politics in Kebbi
These specifically Nigerian forms of politics find a particular local articulation in the region of this study. Kebbi is a new state, created out of the old Sokoto state in 1991.
With a population of 3.2 million, and a predominantly agricultural economy, Kebbi, and Sharia Law in 1999, there has been considerable concern that the region "could become an incubating site for militant Islam and possibly terrorism" (Obi 2006, 99) . Boko
Haram, the violent, fundamentalist Islamist group, "has managed to attract considerable popular support in northern Nigeria despite harsh police and army repression" (Loimeier 2012, 138) . For Western governments, this deteriorating situation has been made addressing poverty in the region a priority. For instance, the UK government's Department for International Development's plan argues, "progress in northern Nigeria will help regional stability across the Sahel, where the potential for terrorism is a concern" (DFID 2009, 3).
Kebbi's status as a relatively new state also has a bearing on this study. The process of establishing the new state's government was highly disruptive, requiring the establishment of a whole range of new bureaucracies, and the relocation of 70% of the previously Sokoto-based staff responsible for administering Kebbi to the new capital, Birnin Kebbi (Alapiki 2005, 63) . Despite the considerable challenges in effectively governing this new, poor, and sparsely populated region, many interviewees in this research emphasized that 'Birnin Kebbi is a small town'. That is to say, a closely connected elite dominates senior positions, and whilst formal bureaucracies are often dysfunctional, those with grievances or requests -at very least the heads of well-known families in good-standing -are usually able to secure an audience with the relevant official relatively quickly. The interpersonal quality of governance in Kebbi state and its consequences will be explored further below.
NGOs
The story of NGOs in development is by now a familiar one: a surge of enthusiasm and activity in the 1990s, followed by a backlash of scepticism (Igoe and Kelsall 2005) .
NGOs have been criticised in a myriad of ways. They have been accused of supporting a neo-liberal agenda (Mohan 2002) , and of acting a comprador class "dependent on external resources and patronage" (Hearn 2007 (Hearn , 1107 . They have also been criticised as being beholden to Western interests, beset by "structural imbalances that reward upward accountability [and] encourage limited, problematic forms of participation" (Dixon and McGregor 2011, 1372) . Similarly, Reimann argues that NGOs are often too reliant on official funding and cooperation, and thus "politically muzzled…shy [ing] away from any meaningful 'empowerment' activities" (2005, 43) . Commins suggests that this muzzling can even result in NGOs acting as "fig-leaves to cover government inaction or indifference to human suffering" (in Pearce 2000, 20) . Finally, Dichter argues that NGOs often struggle to sustain a radical or critical orientation, and instead are liable to "act as if they were corporations engaged in the world of commerce" (1999, 52 ).
Both the technical capabilities and political position of NGOs has been subject to comprehensive criticism. Indeed, the legitimacy and effectiveness of NGOs has even received a degree of popular debate 2 . Given the diversity of organisations calling themselves NGOs, it should not be surprising that such a daunting charge sheet can be assembled. And as Jim Igoe points out, this swing "between exuberance and despair (and sometimes back again)" (2005, xi) has at least as much to do a wildly inflated set of expectations than with the activities of NGOs themselves.
As potent as these criticisms are, they have by no means destroyed the NGO project.
Scholars in the last two decades investigated "the zenith of Africa's NGO revolution" (Igoe and Kelsall 2005, 2) and the subsequent disappointments in real-time. In contrast, the last few years have had a somewhat more mundane tenor: few, it seems,
give serious credence to the notion of NGOs as dynamic agents of revolutionary change. However, despite their credibility being badly wounded, NGOs limp on, and they remain so well entrenched in the development system they not only persist, in many cases, they thrive (Ossewaarde 2008) .
Should the development sector, then, be trying to bring to a close the NGO era? Or would it be better to attempt running repairs to a flawed but still useful sector? The case studies presented below suggest there is something to be salvaged from development
NGOs. However, in this context at least, they may need to rethink their methods of local political advocacy.
Struggling With the State In Kebbi
Why NGOs struggle to fulfil their political potential is in a large part of consequence of their failure to adapt to local contexts. The two case studies here have been chosen to illustrate this. They emerged from a doctoral research project 3 which began by mapping out which people and institutions are most active in providing support and care
for HIV positive people. It quickly became apparent that aside from the families of the affected, the most important actors were government health services and a small group of active NGOs.
Subsequent ethnographic research explored these two groups, which obviously differ in all sorts of ways -the scope and longevity of their interventions, the ways in which they are directed and held to account, the composition of their staff, and so on. Importantly, both the NGO and the doctors acted as advocates for patients, as intermediaries able to urge the government to do more. Both repeatedly cited their mission to speak on behalf of otherwise weak and silenced patients, and both had frequent opportunities to discuss their concerns with the relevant state officials.
Thus, while the two sets of actors are by no means perfectly symmetrical, they occupy a similar position as interlocutors or brokers within the patrimonial state, and both see this form of advocacy as central to their work. The first case study showcases an example of professionals who are skilful in such interactions, and the second is an ethnographic examination of the nature of, and reasons behind, the self-restricting institutional inflexibility of NGOs.
Case Study -Salary reform and medical professionals
In the time I spent working in Kebbi state (which included voluntary work in the HIV sector prior to this research project), the doctors I worked with tended to affect a patrician, paternal, and possessive concern towards their patients. As I met with doctors, arranging house visits (during my voluntary work) or asking about a project they were planning, they were often quick to contextualise their work in local politics.
Doctors often offered opinions without prompting on the desperate state of a particular clinic due to the neglect of an official, satisfaction with improvements at another, and comparisons with facilities in neighbouring states. Furthermore, almost every doctor seemed to be in the process of petitioning the state government for support for one project or another. The causes were various, and covered cases that seemed selfless and others that seemed to involve a measure of personal gain: a plea to improving staffing levels in a maternal clinic or to procure new equipment (perhaps from a supplier acquainted with the doctor).
In conversation, doctors repeatedly emphasised that they were responsible for their patients in a broad sense than included political advocacy as well as clinical care. As the following case study shows, this role involves a combination of sincerity, idealism, and compromise. In early 2010, the Kebbi State Government introduced a new system for paying the salaries of its civil servants. This proved to be a significant controversy, which placed the doctors' role as advocates and brokers at its heart. The state government is a major employer, particularly within the urban centres. This includes teachers, some lecturers, doctors, nurses, as well as various employees of the state's numerous bureaucracies.
The salary change, known as the 'e-payment' system, was introduced by the then The intricate details of the wrangling matter less than the general issues that the controversy illuminates, especially the manner in which it was resolved. The first is the close relationship between the re-distribution of wealth, and the provision of government jobs. In other contexts, hiring large numbers of workers with little expectation that they will perform useful tasks is an anathema to 'good government', in which 'wasting tax-payers' money' is a grievous sin. Yet the concept of 'tax-payers' The problems of poverty and unemployment, especially youth unemployment -are so extreme that hiring workers is seen as an essential duty of the state. Unemployment is also seen as a threat to social order -as one opinion piece in a national newspaper lamented, Governor Dakingari "does not know what to do with huge army of unemployed youth in Kebbi and so they are always available for use in the rising cases of thuggery in the state" (Daily Trust 2010a). There is also a strong ethnic dimension to this process: allocating state resources to Hausa individuals and families was seen as an important responsibility -but this topic is outside the scope of this paper.
Thus, the state government framed the 'e-payment' reform not simply as cutting out corrupt middle men, but also making sure that disbursement was 'correct': that is, amongst a broad spread of the right people, rather than a narrow elite. The state commissioner of finance said in a newspaper interview: "I don't think there should be apprehension over the e-payment system because government [sic] intends to introduce it in order to fish out all ghost workers in the government's pay roll and provide security to salaries of civil servants" (This Day 2009).
As things started to go wrong and payments were blocked, medical professionals taking industrial action in protest were able to reuse this framing for their own purposes. In both private and semi-public meetings, as well as in press statements, they connected their payment issues with concerns over a lack of investment in health care, and especially the ability to recruit and retain health care staff. Despite concerns over the ethics of medical personnel abandoning their posts (Okoye, 2007) , such strikes have been common for some time in Nigeria. Alubo's examination of a series of medical strikes in in the 1970s and 80s demonstrates that they were remarkably successful in securing concessions, in part because of "a sense of doctors as 'special'" (1986, 474) .
In this case, the ability of medical staff -and especially doctors -to exercise their privileged position appears to be intact. The medical strike in Kebbi -after numerous delays and last-ditch negotiations -began on 27 th December 2010 (Sun 2010) . It only lasted a few days, resulting in at least a partial triumph for the strikers. The details of how this deal was resolved are intriguing. In addition to their statements to news media, the doctors were able to leverage their political connections, not least because many were themselves from prominent families.
I knew one doctor 7 particularly well, and would often watch satellite TV at his home in the evenings, as we lived in the same housing estate. He always received a steady stream of guests in the evening: colleagues, family friends, and patients seeking out-ofhours advice. For these guests, he always kept a stethoscope and a pad of prescription forms on the table, and a fridge stocked with soft drinks. During the strike, his living room became something of a nerve centre for negotiations. Although the doctor was not an official negotiator, his seniority and political connections made him an important broker.
The tone of these discussions -at least the ones in which I was present -was strikingly cordial. Emissaries from the state government would arrive, and linger over customary greetings in a particularly deliberate fashion -lamenting the recent passing of a mutual acquaintance, or asking in turn about each other's relatives. The content of the discussion too -despite ostensibly being about a deadlocked labour disputeemphasised consensus.
A shared narrative of health care in the state was often retold -a story I heard again and again in different forms from almost everyone I spoke to. Health care services when
Kebbi state was created in 1991 were extremely basic, and had remained parlous for much of the following decade. Significant improvements had been made since then however, and Kebbi citizens took pride in the fact that fewer patients felt the need to travel out-of-state to receive good care.
7 As discussed, political disputes in Nigeria can be highly contentious and unpredictable, so the doctors quoted are not identified, with the exception of Dr. Sununu, the union representative, who asked to be identified.
A key bargaining chip for the striking doctors was their ability to either endorse or tarnish this narrative of accomplishment. When I asked one doctor about a negotiation he had attended late the previous evening, he said he had told one of the governor's senior aides that they "always tell people how far we [the people of Kebbi] have come, and how the governor has always been our friend". Within the compliment was an implied threat that the doctors might withdraw their valuable support should the dispute not be satisfactorily resolved. An example of doctors and the state governments were frequently at loggerheads over particular issues, but they shared a strong pride that Kebbi was making great strides forward. Even those doctors who were disappointed with Governor Dakingari and his predecessor Muhammad Adamu Aliero nonetheless tempered their criticism -both in public and private -by acknowledging the progress that had been made. by formatting claims in a particular way, and by using social networks and political expertise sensitively, they were able to extract significant concessions. It is important neither to exaggerate nor to underplay these accomplishments. Their actions involved both challenging the patrimonial system, but also working within it. Doctors emphasised how substantive improvements were necessary, and it was not sufficient to 8 Interview, January 11 th , 2011.
buy-off constituencies with promises to build a new clinic or hospital. Nonetheless, in other ways, they accepted and reaffirmed the logic that the governor's role was to be a provider for his people -and they talked about his 'generosity' and 'kindness'.
This example suggests that when the state government is in one sense resilient and able to partially deflect popular disaffection by making commitments that are partly substantive and partly symbolic. Yet it is a form of resilience which savvy groups are able to exploit.
There is a moral ambivalence to the doctors' role. On the one hand, doctors cannot transform Kebbi's political system, and in many cases work effectively 'with the grain' to encourage incremental improvements. On the other hand, this mode of engagement often brings the doctors into the unenviable position as apologists and defenders of a government that is far from perfect. This is a particularly awkward situation with an issue such as salaries, which inevitably combines altruistic reform with elements of selfinterest. The flexible role of the doctors, however, takes on a more respectable sheen compared to the less effective strategy of a large NGO. HFA had a striking concentration of well-qualified and capable staff. Almost all of HFA's employees -even lowly administrative staff and drivers -were graduates, often from Nigeria's most prestigious institutions. Many of the senior staff had studied 9 Again, this decision was made following a process of identifying the organisations most prominent in the lives of the HIV+ people that I researched.
Case Study -Health For All
abroad or worked abroad, or were studying expensive postgraduate distance learning courses at British or American universities. Several were qualified and experienced doctors.
Almost all of HFA's staff also shared a passionate and often highly informed interest in politics. Over lunch, on a long drive to a rural clinic, or after work -conversation invariably turned to political issues, discussing both the fates of various local politicians or parties, and making sense of broader issues in Nigerian society. Most were idealistic, and lamented the current state of Nigeria -often saving me a newspaper cutting, or sharing a link to a cartoon on Facebook to make a point.
In short, HFA was staffed by an educational and intellectual elite, voracious in their appetite for political news in all forms, and sophisticated in their understanding of issues. Additionally, the projects that they had been tasked with delivering -a variety of activities related to HIV treatment support -emphasised the need for engagement and advocacy with the state government. The proficiency of this staff, in combination with their access to international capital -that is to say the funding for their projectwould seem to make them well placed to engage with the Kebbi state government. HFA staff also had extensive contact with state government officials at a variety of levels. They attended the regular meetings of the State Action Committee on AIDS (SACA), a statutory body responsible for coordinating HIV treatment and prevention. Additionally, HFA ran several projects that took place within state facilities, such as a drop-in counseling service for HIV positive people being run at several regional hospitals, which involved frequent meetings with officials.
Nonetheless, a highly cautious mode of political engagement predominated. In private,
HFA staff complained about the state government. Out for drinks after work, the staff would trade stories of the poor condition of a hospital, an incompetent official, or an illconceived project. A particularly common complaint was the government's perceived preference for big capital projects like hospital construction -which was seen as both a political strategy to show demonstrable progress, and an opportunity for corruption during the construction process. These eye-catching projects came at the expense -so they argued -of more mundane activities like staff recruitment and training. They also expressed concern that state hospitals were struggling to retain qualified staff, largely due to low wages. In short, HFA staff broadly shared a reform agenda with the medical professionals. They also emphasised their role as advocates on behalf of patients. One HFA officer, a medical doctor, explained why he had chosen to work for an NGO rather than practice medicine: "When I first qualified, the HIV situation was very bad.
Patients were afraid to come out, and the government was doing nothing about it. That is why we doctors have to be politicians."
Yet during the meetings they had with senior officials, this zeal for advocacy was conspicuously absent. Pleasantries and mundane procedural issues predominated, and it was clear that certain topics, especially corruption and spending priorities were offlimits. When asked about this tension between idealism and political neutrality, HFA gave somewhat contradictory responses: "The political situation here is quite difficult, we need to be quite careful" said one member of staff. Yet in the same conversation, the blame was directed towards HFA itself: "Even the director [of the HFA office in Kebbi] is not really the director, our programme is all planned for us before we arrive." 11 Another said "at the SACA meetings, we are always being asked for something, and you know, these are very good ideas -some small workshops or something, but our hands are tied, we cannot freelance" 12 . In short, they attributed their reticence to two factors: one was a pragmatic understanding that state government was ultimately a gatekeeper to their work, and they relied on its consent to continue. To be told to leave would be a professional disaster for the senior staff.
The second constraint -a subtle but powerful factor -was a pervasive form of upward accountability. A particular phrase captures this issue: 'it needs to be sent to Abuja'.
The 'it' being a report, form, spreadsheet or other document, and 'Abuja' meaning HFA's head office. Among the staff, the phrase was repeated almost mantra-like, to the point where its common usage became an in-joke.
For instance, HFA began a round of workshops training volunteers to give advice on drug adherence counselling -sessions to encourage patients to take their anti-retroviral drugs correctly, long recognised as a complex and important issue in HIV treatment (e.g. Rao et al. 2007 ). It quickly became clear to both the HFA staff and myself, as I sat in on these sessions, that the training was at too basic a level, and largely unnecessary as most of the participants had clearly already been well schooled on these issues at previous events. This may well be in part because these particular treatment-competent groups tended to contain few of the younger patients that are seen as especially challenging for drug adherence (Falang et al. 2012 Individually, these examples may seem trivial, and reflect working practices flawed in a rather obvious manner -they were certainly obvious enough to greatly frustrate all parties. Taken collectively, however, the pattern across the organisation, aggregated to form a reliably wasteful way of operating. "These NGOs are always going to do their own small-small things", said one doctor, expressing a common acceptance that NGOs were almost wilfully marginalising themselves. Tellingly, when I discussed my impressions with doctors, workers at other NGOs and others besides, no one ever seemed surprised. Instead, people nodded with wry smiles of familiarity and frustration.
Conclusion
Even though the professionals discussed in this paper pursue similar goals, move in similar circles, and indeed often know each, they act through strikingly different strategies. The doctors are nimble enough to exploit opportunities (such as upcoming elections) and sufficiently deft to blend occasional confrontation with supportive engagement. They are skilled at moving between roles and registers -one day the dutiful supporter of the government, the next a public-minded physician ready to raise the alarm for his imperilled patients, the day after that, dutiful once more. They read the political situation skilfully, and are able to "capitalise on clientelism and ruleflexibility" (Kelsall 2011, 255 ).
Yet flexibility in tactics implies a concomitant flexibility in ethics. Their tactics can be and are used for the benefit of themselves, and for the broader public good -sometimes at the same time. This places doctors in an ambivalent position regarding the patrimonial state -the line between incrementally improving things and endorsing the status quo is fine one. They cannot be said to be meaningfully subverting or undermining it. It is plausible that the immediate gains they are attracting make more radical future improvements more difficult. But in light of the durability of patrimonialism as a political system in this context, it appears that going 'with the grain' is indeed the only effective strategy for encouraging reform.
The NGO, and others like it in the area, orientates itself towards the state very differently. The local expertise of the NGO staff is no match for an internationally driven mode of working that precludes the strategies used by doctors. Research elsewhere suggests that this situation is by no means unique, with supposedly progressive organisations dominated by "management tools concerned with enforcing and regulating" (Powell and Seddon 1997, 7) , or worse "apolitical institutions geared toward the process of donor funding cycles" (Igoe 2003, 863 ; see also Harsh et al. 2010 ).
Could such an NGO find developmental opportunities even in a political system that is a major cause of underdevelopment? Perhaps so, if they were willing to experiment with more flexible forms of accountability, ones which blend necessary rigour with discretion devolved to local officers (see Routley 2012 for a compelling example).
Being able to improvise and adapt, and engage in petty quid-pro-quos could help build the "formal and informal channels of access to key political decision-makers" (Bratton 1990, 116) that are so crucial to effective advocacy.
Further exploration of what it means to work 'with the grain' will likely emphasis the context-specificity of the issue. The sheer variety in the nature and permanence of patrimonial states will lead to different conclusions to those presented here. In other states where institutions are evolving in different ways, a 'good governance' agenda and straitlaced NGO strategies may be far more appropriate. Elsewhere, in places more like Northern Nigeria, devising a mode of working that balances the understandable need of donors for clarity and accountability with complex, unpredictable and ethically murky realities will remain a formidable task.
